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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

SALT TWO
SESSION I
A-114

DATE: December 18, 1972
TIME: 7:15 - 8:15 p.m.
PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's
Residence, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Col C. G. FitzGerald

Gen-Lt K. A. Trusov

Col V. V. Budantsev (part-time)

Col V. P. Starodubov (part-time)

Capt A. N. Mazerkin (part-time)

During Ambassador Rimestad's reception for the Soviet Delegation, General Trusov made comments on the topics listed below.

Throw-weight

The conversation on this subject was opened by Colonels Budantsev and Starodubov (neither General Trusov nor Captain Mazerkin was present initially). They asked whether I could clarify some of the "fine points" in the definition of throw-weight. I asked what "fine points" they had in mind. Before either could reply, General Trusov joined us and asked what we were discussing. Upon learning the topic he said he was not interested in knowing what the U. S. side means by "throw-weight." At this point, the two Colonels left us and the remainder of the discussion was between General Trusov and myself, except for the last topic listed below.

I asked why General Trusov had made this remark. He replied that first of all he understands what throw-weight is. Secondly, the Soviet side does not agree with the U. S. proposal and does not believe that throw-weight is a criterion to be used in limiting strategic offensive weapons.

I asked what his understanding of throw-weight is and what the Russian expression for this understanding is. I assumed the

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the expression was not the U. S. coined phrase "zabratsyayemy ves." He said it was not the latter and continued that "throw-weight" is everything that remains on a missile after the last booster stage drops off. He said if this were the U. S. meaning in its use of the word, then the corresponding Russian expression is "polezny ves" (literally, "useful weight"). He added the thought that one's viewpoint on the "usefulness" of the weight depends upon whether one is on the sending or receiving end.

We then had a long exchange on the meaning of Academician Shchukin's mini-plenary statement to the effect that throw-weight is not an urgent problem. I said that the way Shchukin had phrased his statement could be interpreted to suggest that throw-weight would be discussed by the Soviet side after other problems had been resolved. General Trusov disagreed. He said the word used was "aktual'ny," which has two meanings--(1) the meaning of urgent in the sense of time, and (2) the meaning of a "non-existing problem." The latter was the meaning used by the Soviet Delegation. He went on to say that if there were any doubts on this score, I should carefully read Minister Semenov's words today referring to the totality of the strategic situation, geographic factors, and technological developments. He repeated earlier Soviet statements that the Interim Agreement resolved the throw-weight problem. He ignored my comment that the Interim Agreement is only a temporary agreement and said that, given the two sub-ceilings on ICBMs and on throw-weight proposed by the U. S. side, there could be only one technological outcome--the sides would have to develop a common ICBM. General Trusov did not believe the USSR would agree to such an outcome, especially in view of the Soviet side's views on freedom-to-mix.

General Alekseyev, New Soviet Weapons, and "Restraint"

I remarked in connection with his comment on the usefulness of "useful weight" that this touch of humor provided the answer to a long unanswered question--whether General Trusov had replaced General Ogarkov or General Alekseyev on the Soviet Delegation. Obviously it had been the latter who did, in fact, have a fine sense of humor. General Trusov said there was nothing strange about that since he had worked for General Alekseyev for many years and

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still does work for him. I asked whether General Alekseyev was well. He said "yes, and very busy." I asked whether he is busy developing new weapons. After some hesitation General Trusov said yes, but in the context of "restraint" as proposed by the Soviet Delegation. I expressed some doubt about how restrained such an active man as General Alekseyev might be. General Trusov referred me to a decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers published in mid-June in Pravda and Izvestiya which directed all to comply with the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. I noted he had not mentioned Red Star. He said the latter did not publish the decree as he recalled. He did, however, believe that Red Star has been showing "restraint" in its treatment of U.S. - USSR relations since May 26.

FBS and Non-Transfer

General Trusov said the entire Soviet Delegation had reacted extremely negatively to the U.S. statement on FBS. He himself thought that the statement was offensive in that it did not address the issue but criticized the logic of the Soviet side. He said Minister Semenov had reacted very strongly and had thought about making a negative report on the statement to Moscow. He (Trusov) had, however, pointed out to Minister Semenov that the "statement was meant not for those who are here but for those who are not here." General Trusov also felt that the Soviet side would be reading about the statement in the West European press in three or four days. I assured him he was wrong on both points.

General Trusov then repeated the usual points on FBS concluding that in the nuclear age any weapon, whether ICBM, SLBM, or bomber, can deliver more destructive force than all the bombs which were dropped in World War II. And FBS can carry as much of a payload as can the three "so-called central systems." General Trusov said he, however, remained optimistic. He believes that ultimately the U.S. side will come to agree "in principle" that FBS are "strategic." Given such agreement, the details of FBS can be discussed and a solution reached. He drew an analogy between such future discussions and those of the ABM treaty which saw one side proposing 4:1, 3:1, etc., and the other proposing its own variations, until agreement was reached.

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I said I saw no grounds for his optimism and recalled for him the unilateral advantages the USSR has because of its MR/IRBMs and medium bombers. He declared that SALT is a bilateral negotiation and weapons required for defense against third countries are not subject to SALT. I noted the inconsistency between this position and the Soviet attempt to include British and French SLBMs among its considerations. He asked, "whose missiles go in the British submarines?" He then said that such a situation is the reason for the Soviet position on non-transfer. He noted that the US-UK agreement is to be reviewed "in the very near future"--two, three months, he thought.

Long-Range SLBM Tests

I asked whether he did not agree with Ambassador Smith's statement that transit time is not a useful criterion for assessing submarines. General Trusov said this was another aspect of today's statement which was negatively received, because it criticized the Soviet side's logic. Moreover, it was merely repeating something that had been rumored in the press. I assured him that this was not true. Secretary Laird had spoken about the tests officially. General Trusov said he could accept the statement as a serious one if this were so. He said that this still does not justify criticism of Soviet logic. Tests of such long-range SLBMs are another example of the Soviet approach to this phase. A mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached between the sides as to the testing of such new missiles.

Airborne BM and Long-Range SLCMs

General Trusov then said that other examples of what he meant were the Soviet proposals on banning development of airborne ballistic missiles--I interjected "strategic," to which he replied, all ballistic missiles--and long-range SLCMs. I asked whether the phrase "airborne" meant platforms of types other than bombers and what ranges of ballistic missiles. He replied that it was specifically bombers and all ranges--as low as 10-20 kilometers--just as long as the missile is ballistic.

I asked what he meant by a long-range SLCM. He said the question of range was a technical one which could be decided after

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agreement was reached in principle. He drew an analogy to the agreement which was reached on the definition of an ICBM for the Interim Agreement.

SCC

General Trusov commented on the recent problems the SWG has been having with regard to the "Draft Regulations." He criticized the U. S. for having changed its mind on the document which had been previously agreed to. The USSR Delegation had forwarded the draft with a positive recommendation and Moscow had reacted favorably. He said that the Soviet Delegation now cannot accept any notation in the upper right hand corner. He did not mention a footnote nor did I raise the question. He said their proposed title "Basic Provisions for the Joint Draft Regulations" eliminated the need for a note that it is a JDT. I pointed out that the Soviet proposed title did not include the word "Joint." He said he thought it did. He concluded that the USSR Delegation will not go back to Moscow with any more changes and that the problem will have to be resolved here.

Soviet Military Discipline in SALT

I left General Trusov at this point and joined the three other Soviet participants for a conversation which was largely non-substantive, revolving around how the three of them liked the diplomatic work involved in SALT. General Trusov again joined the group and I observed that he obviously liked the diplomacy of SALT since he has been engaged in it for a long time. He disagreed and said he much preferred his normal duties. A soldier is a soldier, however. He then said that the Soviet military members of the Delegation are disciplined people who follow instructions-- I interjected, naturally from Marshal Grechko and he said no, from higher authority. He could not, however, say the same of the diplomats and one or two other people. He concluded that if anybody doubted whether the military were not right and not supported by higher authorities, he should review the negotiations leading up to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, as well as the agreements themselves.

SALDEL:CGFitzGerald:ar
19 December 1972

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